Greenberg, A;
(2021)
Why Criminal Responsibility for Negligence Cannot be Indirect.
Cambridge Law Journal
(In press).
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Abstract
A popular way to try to justify holding defendants criminally responsible for inadvertent negligence is via an indirect or “tracing” approach, i.e. an approach which traces the inad-vertence back to prior culpable action. I argue that this indirect approach to criminal neg-ligence fails because it cannot account for a key feature of how criminal negligence should be (and sometimes is) assessed. Specifically, it cannot account for why, when considering whether a defendant is negligent, what counts as a risk should be assessed relative to the defendant’s evidence.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Why Criminal Responsibility for Negligence Cannot be Indirect |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-... |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | Criminal negligence, gross negligence manslaughter, culpability, tracing |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10129848 |
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