Vorhaus, J;
(2021)
Respect, cognitive capacity and profound disability.
Metaphilosophy
, 52
(5)
pp. 541-555.
10.1111/meta.12510.
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Abstract
According to one prominent form of moral individualism, how an individual is to be treated is determined, not by considering her group membership, but by considering her own particular characteristics. On this view, so this paper argues, it is not possible to provide an account of why people with profound cognitive disabilities are owed respect. This conclusion is not new, but it has been challenged by writers who are sympathetic to the recommended emphasis. The paper aims to show that the conclusion cannot be avoided, and to look at what is to be learned from an approach that leads us to this point. It suggests that any account of why profoundly disabled people are owed respect will have to supplement discussion of their particular capacities with a normative account of their humanity.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Respect, cognitive capacity and profound disability |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1111/meta.12510 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12510 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | human rights, moral individualism, moral status, profound disability, respect |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > School of Education UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > School of Education > UCL Institute of Education UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > School of Education > UCL Institute of Education > IOE - Education, Practice and Society |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10123727 |
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