Figueira, F;
Espinoza, R;
(2023)
Bargaining the Euro: Making an EU Fiscal Union Politically Acceptable.
European Review
, 31
(3)
pp. 252-272.
10.1017/S1062798723000030.
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Abstract
An EU Fiscal Union is being discussed as a way to avoid future euro-crises and guarantee the stability of the euro. So far, however, it has proved politically impossible, as EU countries are unwilling to give up their sovereignty on fiscal policy. This article develops a bargaining model that sheds light on how fiscal pooling could become politically acceptable. The model differentiates between the ‘South’ (net beneficiaries) and the ‘North’ (net payers). We find that fiscal pooling should be done via a combination of the fiscal instruments with the highest fiscal multipliers. Instead of a single Fiscal Union, we therefore propose a combination of fiscal pooling instruments which, together, add up to the sufficient level of fiscal integration.
Type: | Article |
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Title: | Bargaining the Euro: Making an EU Fiscal Union Politically Acceptable |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.1017/S1062798723000030 |
Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798723000030 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Academia Europaea. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > SSEES |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10123708 |
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