Bel, G;
Bel-Piñana, P;
Rosell, J;
(2017)
Myopic PPPs: Risk allocation and hidden liabilities for taxpayers and users.
Utilities Policy
, 48
pp. 147-156.
10.1016/j.jup.2017.06.002.
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Abstract
Drawing on evidence from three case studies, we show how the State's Financial Liability has worked in assigning risk in large PPP contracts in Spain. Project failure and the concessionaires' bankruptcy have resulted in the government having to assume heavy financial obligations, which have ultimately been absorbed by taxpayers and users. In contrast, Spain's leading construction companies, which were also major investors in the concessionaires, have been able to minimize their risk. Myopic PPPs have been entered into based on the transference of liabilities to taxpayers and users, and the, consequent, minimization of risks for the main private investors.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Myopic PPPs: Risk allocation and hidden liabilities for taxpayers and users |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jup.2017.06.002 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2017.06.002 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | Public-private partnerships, Concessions, Infrastructure projects, Transportation, Energy |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Political Science |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10123079 |
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