Horton, J;
(2021)
Partial Aggregation in Ethics.
Philosophy Compass
, 16
(3)
, Article e12719. 10.1111/phc3.12719.
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Abstract
Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer ‘yes’ and ‘no’, respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. These views contrast with fully aggregative moral views, which imply that the answer to both questions is ‘yes’, and with non-aggregative moral views, which imply that the answer to both questions is ‘no’. In this article, I review the most natural and influential ways of developing partially aggregative views and explain the main problems they face.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Partial Aggregation in Ethics |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1111/phc3.12719 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12719 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10118032 |
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