Viehoff, Daniel Reinhold Sascha;
(2004)
Interpreting self-deception.
Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London).
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Abstract
My thesis analyses the apparent clash between a central tenet of Davidson's interpretation theory, viz. that our attribution of mental states must make the subject look maximally rational, and our psychological vernacular that allows us to attribute to someone irrational belief states like self-deception. Self-deception, according to Davidson, involves two contradictory beliefs p and not-p, where not-p comes about as the consequence of an intentional action performed by the agent in order to avoid recognising that p. This conception of self-deception must explain why holding contradictory beliefs does not lead to the negation of one of them. Davidson addresses this problem by introducing the notion of a 'mental boundary', which holds apart the content of the contradictory beliefs, while allowing their causal interaction. I argue that this reduces self-deception to a 'mental short-circuit', and cannot make sense of our ordinary conception of it. Davidson's reference to intentional action creates a further difficulty: a false belief that has been intentionally brought about lacks a characteristic features of beliefs, their aiming at the truth. The incapacity to account for self-deception points to a more general difficulty in Davidson's view of the mind. To account for the relationship between first- and third-personal uses of mental terms, Davidson's interpretation theory should be understood in terms of 'imaginative projection'. This highlights a fundamental problem: a theory that takes interpretation to constitute the mental realm cannot explain how the concept of self-deception can come about. My final chapter analyses the sources of the difficulty: if interpretation aims at formulating 'total theories', it cannot make sense of self-deception, which has local links that are 'rational' in a limited sense but irrational in the bigger picture. To accommodate self-deception, interpretation theory should conceive of interpretation in terms of interest- and occasion-dependent projects.
| Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
|---|---|
| Qualification: | M.Phil |
| Title: | Interpreting self-deception |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Thesis digitised by ProQuest. |
| Keywords: | Philosophy, religion and theology; Davidson, Donald |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10105770 |
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