Osborne, Claire Judith;
(2004)
The nature of transcendental arguments.
Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London).
![]() |
Text
The_nature_of_transcendental_a.pdf Download (4MB) |
Abstract
This thesis aims to examine the viability of transcendental arguments, by considering the presuppositions involved in the use of such arguments. In Chapter One, 1 consider what a 'transcendental argument' consists in. Certain difficulties with existing specifications of such arguments are identified and discussed, to yield a characterisation of this type of argument. I consider the role of an anti-sceptical purpose in the conception of a transcendental argument and argue that this purpose is not an element of that conception. The characterisation offered generates two types of issue. First, it is noted the characterisation offered is vague with respect to the type of necessity involved in a transcendental argument. Secondly, certain theoretical presuppositions that may be required by the type of argument specified are articulated, concerning the nature of a priority and the nature of our cognitive and conceptual capacities. It is argued that to give content to this notion of necessity and to examine whether the putative theoretical presuppositions are in fact made, specific transcendental arguments require examination. To this end, in Chapters Two and Three, respectively, I interpret and analyse two paradigmatic transcendental arguments, Kant's Refutation of Idealism and Davidson's Argument for the Veridical Nature of Belief In Chapter Four, the results of these analyses are collated. A characterisation of the type of necessity involved in a transcendental argument is formulated and assessed, and the conception of a priority presupposed by such arguments is articulated and evaluated. It is also argued that transcendental arguments as a class do not presuppose the indubitability of our possession or exercise of cognitive and conceptual capacities, and consecquently such arguments are consistent with a variety of conceptions of the mental. I conclude that transcendental arguments are a viable means of argumentation, at least with respect to the issues considered here.
Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
---|---|
Qualification: | M.Phil |
Title: | The nature of transcendental arguments |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | Thesis digitised by ProQuest. |
Keywords: | Philosophy, religion and theology; Transcendental arguments |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10105768 |
Archive Staff Only
![]() |
View Item |