Bertelli, Anthony M;
Valentina, Valentina;
Woodhouse, Eleanor Florence;
(2021)
Corruption, Democracy, and Privately Financed Infrastructure.
Administration and Society
, 53
(3)
327 -352.
10.1177/0095399720944548.
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Abstract
Do political institutions moderate the influence of corruption on privately financed infrastructure projects? We argue that electoral competition incentivizes politicians to monitor bureaucratic corruption and focus on the public benefits of projects. Without such incentives, corruption is not monitored and the private benefits of bribes and favorable contract terms are responsible for increasing numbers of projects. Studying 116 countries between 1984 and 2012, we find that as public-sector corruption increases in democracies, no change in the number of projects is observed, while more projects emerge in non-democracies as corruption worsens.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Corruption, Democracy, and Privately Financed Infrastructure |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1177/0095399720944548 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399720944548 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | Public–private partnerships, infrastructure, electoral competition |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Political Science |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10105715 |
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