Porter, William Thomas M.;
(2003)
Sensitivity, choice, luck and insurance: A reading of Ronald Dworkin's egalitarianism.
Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London).
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Abstract
In this thesis I consider Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality of resources. Dworkin states that his concern is to interpret the 'abstract principle of equal concern', and I try to reach a full understanding of his interpretation. I argue that the best articulation of the theory takes it to be a form of limited liberal perfectionism which is answerable to (our) society's shared conception of the good. This articulation is not vulnerable to accusations of tacit welfarism which might be provoked by the role of the Dworkinian notion of 'auction sensitivity to plans and preferences'; and it is equally safe from the attacks of 'luck egalitarian' critics such as G.A. Cohen, who hold that the motivation at the root of their own and Dworkin's egalitarianism is that no one should suffer because of bad brute luck. These critics think that Dworkin's distinction between a person and her circumstances aligns with a distinction between what is compensable and what is not compensable in the name of justice. I show that this rests on a mistaken understanding of Dworkin. 'Luck egalitarians' have come under fire themselves recently from philosophers who dispute this interpretation of egalitarianism. I argue that their criticisms should not be directed at Dworkin, whose theory should not be considered 'luck egalitarian' at all.
Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
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Qualification: | M.Phil |
Title: | Sensitivity, choice, luck and insurance: A reading of Ronald Dworkin's egalitarianism |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | Thesis digitised by ProQuest. |
Keywords: | Philosophy, religion and theology; Dworkin, Ronald |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10105650 |
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