Jakobsen, Mathilde Byskov; (2002) Kant's principle of transcendental apperception. Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London).

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Abstract

In this dissertation I defend the thesis that Kant's claims about the principle of transcendental apperception can form the basis of a Kantian theory of mind. In order to defend this thesis I offer, in part one of the dissertation, an interpretation of transcendental apperception as it appears in the 'Transcendental Deduction'. I argue that transcendental apperception is primarily a principle of the unity of consciousness from which a non-substantial identity claim follows. I also examine the relation of the unity of consciousness to the 'I think', spontaneity, apperceptive self-awareness, and to the deduction of the categories. In the second part I give an analysis of the 'Paralogisms' and of central issues that arises from this analysis, such as the noumenal ignorance thesis, and the status of transcendental psychology and its relation to cognitive science. I argue that Kant's claims about transcendental apperception do amount to a theory of mind, but only to a theory of the mind considered transcendentally. I argue that this restriction means that transcendental apperception gives us information about the functions and capacities that we must necessarily represent the mind as having, when we consider it in transcendental reflection. However, it does not give us any information about how, or even whether, these functions and capacities are realised.

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