Sen, Madhucchanda; (2001) On internalist intuitions: A study in the externalist-internalist debate. Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London).

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Abstract

This thesis is on the externalist-internalist debate in the Philosophy of Mind. Externalism and internalism are two contesting theses about the individuation of mental states. Externalism is the thesis that there are some mental states which entail the existence of the objects on which they are directed, or that the thinker's environment is a certain way. Internalism, on the other hand, is the thesis which says that mental states of persons are such that there is no necessary or deep individuative relation (Burge) between the individual's being in states of those kinds and the nature of the individual's physical and social environments. Consequently no mental states can entail the existence of the objects which the states are directed towards, or entail that the environment is a certain way. One major worry associated with the debate is that it is hard to find common ground between internalists and externalists in terms of which we can make sense of the debate. The Twin Earth stories were originally used to generate intuitions in support of externalism but these intuitions are controversial. I propose that the contending parties have other commitments which explain why they take stands they do. Those other commitments are the ones to be questioned and hence the solution to or the resolution of the debate can be attained only by questioning those commitments. In this thesis I talk about two such presuppositions that the internalists have made. I give a defence of externalism by questioning those presuppositions. The first chapter of the thesis is a survey of the debate and an investigation of the motivations that lead the contending parties to uphold their positions. The kind of support that I give to externalism is a negative one. It comes in form of an attack on the following presuppositions of the internalist: (a) We can consider two mental states to be the same (i.e. type identical) if the subject cannot discriminate between them; and (b) We can consider two mental states to be the same if they give rise to the same behaviour. The second chapter is an attack on the first presupposition. It is argued that there are instances of mental states where subjective indiscriminability cannot be regarded as evidence for sameness. The third chapter counters the second presupposition by showing that the notion of behaviour that the internalists are invoking in order to hold onto this presupposition is a very restricted notion of behaviour. However, externalism seems to face the problem of mental causation, so accordingly, the fourth chapter deals with this problem. Davidson has a clear answer to the problem of mental causation and he is also an externalist. And so there is a clear defence of the compatibility of mental causation and externalism, which I endorse.

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