Fernandez, Miguel Angel; (2001) Contextualist solutions to Cartesian scepticism. Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London).

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Abstract

In this thesis I argue that the contextualist solution to scepticism about knowledge of the external world fails to accomplish its own goals. In chapter I I identify the sceptical argument that contextualists focus on and describe the problem posed by that argument that contextualists want to solve. I point out that the goals of the contextualist solution to the sceptical problem are (1) dissolve the paradox of intuitions generated by the sceptical argument previously identified: we have intuitions for the premises and against the conclusion of that (valid) argument; and (2) justify the claim that relative to the epistemic standards operative in everyday contexts people can have knowledge of the world. In section 1 of chapter II I expound and discuss the semantic theory of knowledge ascriptions within which contextualists pursue the two goals of their solution to the sceptical problem. According to that semantic theory the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions are sensitive to facts about the context in which the ascriptions are made. In section 2 of chapter II I explain how this semantic theory is used to dissolve the sceptical paradox. In chapter III I argue that there's evidence for thinking that, in effect, the semantic content of knowledge ascriptions is sensitive to contextual facts. I defend this idea against two objections. But then I argue that the particular manner in which contextualists construe that context sensitivity doesn't give them what they expected from it, viz. the resources to accomplish goals (1) and (2) of their solution to the sceptical problem.

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