Gorbenko, AS;
Malenko, A;
(2014)
Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions.
The Journal of Finance
, 69
(6)
pp. 2513-2555.
10.1111/jofi.12194.
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Abstract
Using data on auctions of companies, we estimate valuations (maximum willingness to pay) of strategic and financial bidders from their bids. We find that a typical target is valued higher by strategic bidders. However, 22.4% of targets in our sample are valued higher by financial bidders. These are mature, poorly performing companies. We also find that (i) valuations of different strategic bidders are more dispersed and (ii) valuations of financial bidders are correlated with aggregate economic conditions. Our results suggest that different targets appeal to different types of bidders, rather than that strategic bidders always value targets more because of synergies.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1111/jofi.12194 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12194 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > UCL School of Management |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10104962 |
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