Gorbenko, AS;
Malenko, A;
(2011)
Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions.
American Economic Review
, 101
(5)
pp. 1806-1841.
10.1257/aer.101.5.1806.
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Abstract
We study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. The sellers compete by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets. Upon observing auction designs, potential bidders decide which auctions to enter. We characterize all symmetric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in which auctions are in standard securities or their combinations. In large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash. We extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1257/aer.101.5.1806 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.5.1806 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > UCL School of Management |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10104959 |
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