Neil, Charles Anthony;
(2020)
"Internal Justification and Anti-Luck Epistemology: A Compatibilist Proposal".
Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London).
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Abstract
The thesis examines a version of awareness internalism about epistemic justification according to which justified belief requires reliably formed belief in conjunction with second-order awareness. It supports this version of internalism by appealing to a conception of knowledge as a variety of non-lucky true belief; different types of epistemic luck are delineated and a modal safety-based response to epistemic luck is adopted. An epistemically justified belief, according to this version of awareness internalism, is more than a blameless belief; reliabilist insights about the nature of justification are used to explain this verdict. The thesis identifies two sceptical arguments against using anti-luck considerations to motivate awareness internalism but finds the arguments surmountable. The resultant view is a form of awareness internalism motivated by anti-luck considerations, which incorporates internal and external conditions for justification to respond to sceptical objections and explain a broad class of epistemic intuitions. Thus, it will illustrate how both sides of the contemporary internalist and externalist debate are partially correct. Nevertheless, the anti-sceptical import of awareness internalism is qualified. By considering whether awareness internalism can respond to regress scepticism, the thesis identifies a meta-epistemological anxiety about whether we do, in fact, have justified beliefs; awareness internalism does not ameliorate this concern. Similarly, the thesis identifies counterexamples to the awareness condition. The thesis contends that a non-dogmatic response to counterexamples, one which accommodates the broadest range of intuitions, allows that knowledge does not always require a belief to satisfy the awareness condition for justification. It is contended that counterexamples to awareness internalism may be regarded as instances of normatively impoverished knowledge, but knowledge, nonetheless.
| Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
|---|---|
| Qualification: | M.Phil |
| Title: | "Internal Justification and Anti-Luck Epistemology: A Compatibilist Proposal" |
| Event: | UCL (University College London) |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Copyright © The Author 2020. Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms. Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10103261 |
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