Habibi, Amir;
(2020)
Essays in Information and Incentives.
Doctoral thesis (Ph.D), UCL (University College London).
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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters that theoretically consider different ways in which incentives can be provided through information. Chapter 1 is an infor- mation design with moral hazard problem in which a planner wants to optimally motivate a time-inconsistent agent by providing feedback. I provide conditions under which the optimal feedback takes a simple form of a cutoff. Chapter 2 and 3 consider whether or not a firm would want to choose to be transparent about pay within the organisation. Chapter 2 considers a static set-up, and Chapter 3 considers a dynamic set-up. The main finding—across the two chapters—is that as the value of retaining the best workers goes up, then transparency becomes more favourable.
| Type: | Thesis (Doctoral) |
|---|---|
| Qualification: | Ph.D |
| Title: | Essays in Information and Incentives |
| Event: | UCL |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Copyright © The Author 2020. Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms. Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10094295 |
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