Schaab, JD; (2021) On the Supposed Incoherence of Obligations to Oneself. Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 99 (1) pp. 175-189. 10.1080/00048402.2020.1714677.

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Abstract

An influential argument against the possibility of obligations to oneself states that the very notion of such obligations is incoherent: If there were such obligations, we could release ourselves from them; yet releasing oneself from an obligation is impossible. I challenge this argument by arguing against the premise that it is impossible to release oneself from an obligation. I point out that this premise assumes that if it were possible to release oneself from an obligation, it would be impossible to violate that obligation. I note that there are two interpretations of this assumption, one conceptual and one psychological. I argue that, on both interpretations, the assumption is false—at least according to independently plausible accounts of obligations to oneself and of what it means to waive an obligation. My arguments paint a picture of obligations to oneself that not only challenges the argument against their incoherence, but also illuminates these obligations’ relationship to other parts of the moral domain.

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