Das, N;
(2020)
The Value of Biased Information.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
10.1093/bjps/axaa003.
(In press).
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Abstract
In this article, I cast doubt on an apparent truism: namely, that if evidence is available for gathering and use at a negligible cost, then it’s always instrumentally rational for us to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions. Call this the ‘value of information’ thesis. I show that the value of information thesis conflicts with two other plausible theses. The first is the view that an agent’s evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. The second is the view that epistemic rationality requires us to update our credences by conditionalization. These two theses, given some plausible assumptions, make room for rationally biased inquiries where the value of information thesis fails. I go on to argue that this is bad news for defenders of the value of information thesis.
Type: | Article |
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Title: | The Value of Biased Information |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.1093/bjps/axaa003 |
Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axaa003 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10089757 |
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