Schaab, J;
(2019)
Commitment and the Second-Person Standpoint.
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung
, 73
(4)
pp. 511-532.
10.3196/004433019827816789.
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Abstract
On Chang's voluntarist account of commitments, when we commit to φ, we employ the 'normative powers' of our will to give ourselves a reason to φ that we would otherwise not have had. I argue that Chang's account, by itself, does not have sufficient conceptual resources to reconcile the normative significance of commitments with their alleged fundamentally volitional character. I suggest an alternative, second-personal account of commitment, which avoids this problem. On this account, the volitional act involved in committing is one of holding ourselves accountable, thus putting us under to a pro tanto obligation to ourselves. The second-personal account implies that there is an interesting link between commitment and morality.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Commitment and the Second-Person Standpoint |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.3196/004433019827816789 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.3196/004433019827816789 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10087502 |
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