Picollo, L;
(2019)
Alethic Reference.
Journal of Philosophical Logic
10.1007/s10992-019-09524-w.
(In press).
Preview |
Text
Picollo2019_Article_AlethicReference.pdf - Published Version Download (418kB) | Preview |
Abstract
I put forward precise and appealing notions of reference, self-reference, and well-foundedness for sentences of the language of first-order Peano arithmetic extended with a truth predicate. These notions are intended to play a central role in the study of the reference patterns that underlie expressions leading to semantic paradox and, thus, in the construction of philosophically well-motivated semantic theories of truth.
Type: | Article |
---|---|
Title: | Alethic Reference |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.1007/s10992-019-09524-w |
Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09524-w |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | © The Author(s) 2019. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. |
Keywords: | Semantic paradoxes, Reference, Self-reference, Well-foundedness |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10080807 |



1. | ![]() | 6 |
2. | ![]() | 1 |
3. | ![]() | 1 |
Archive Staff Only
![]() |
View Item |