Hu, Xiang Nong;
(2019)
A New Reading of Kant's Second Analogy in the Light of Lovejoy's Criticism.
Masters thesis (M.Phil.Stud), UCL (University College London).
Preview |
Text
Final Thesis.pdf - Accepted Version Download (756kB) | Preview |
Abstract
In his article “On Kant’s Reply to Hume” (1906), Arthur Lovejoy raises four interconnected objections to Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy. In general, Lovejoy argues that (i) Kant fails to establish that the principle of causality is the basis of the distinction between subjective and objective perceptions of change; (ii) Kant fails to establish that the principle of causality is the basis of the distinction between perceptions of stationary and moving objects; (iii) due to point (i) and (ii), what Kant proves in the Second Analogy has nothing to do with the principle of causality. Therefore, Kant commits the non-sequitur when he concludes that by appealing to the principle of causality, we know a priori that the same kind of antecedent will always be followed by the same kind of consequent; (iv) because of the non-sequitur, Kant fails to respond to Hume’s skepticism about particular causal principles. In this thesis, I defend Kant from Lovejoy’s objections, in the light of which a new interpretation of the Second Analogy will also be provided. I argue that, in contrast to what Lovejoy claims, Kant successfully demonstrates in the Second Analogy that the principle of causality is not only the distinguishing criterion between subjective and objective perceptions of change but is also the distinguishing criterion between perceptions of stationary and moving objects. In addition, the conclusion of the Second Analogy is just a re-statement of what Kant proves, which can be put as a transcendental argument that suggests that the principle of causality is the necessary condition of the possibility of occurrence (experience of objective successions/moving objects), which does not commit any non-sequitur. Consequently, as far as Kant himself is concerned, this transcendental argument is sufficient to respond to Hume’s skepticism concerning the principle of causality (both general and particular).
| Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
|---|---|
| Qualification: | M.Phil.Stud |
| Title: | A New Reading of Kant's Second Analogy in the Light of Lovejoy's Criticism |
| Event: | UCL |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Copyright © The Author 2019. Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10065532 |
Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
