Das, N;
Salow, B;
(2018)
Transparency and the KK Principle.
Noûs
, 52
(1)
pp. 3-23.
10.1111/nous.12158.
Preview |
Text
transparency.pdf - Accepted Version Download (605kB) | Preview |
Abstract
An important question in epistemology is whether the KK principle is true, i.e., whether an agent who knows that p is also thereby in a position to know that she knows that p. We explain how a “transparency” account of self‐knowledge, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. In particular, we show that such an account allows us to reconcile a version of the KK principle with an “externalist” or “reliabilist” conception of knowledge commonly thought to make that principle particularly problematic.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Transparency and the KK Principle |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1111/nous.12158 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12158 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10061170 |
Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
