Das, N;
(2018)
Object reidentification and the epistemic role of attention.
Ratio
, 31
(4)
pp. 402-414.
10.1111/rati.12214.
Preview |
Text
object_reidentification_and_the_epistemic_role_of_attention.pdf - Accepted Version Download (738kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Reidentification scepticism is the view that we cannot knowledgeably reidentify previously perceived objects. Amongst classical Indian philosophers, the Buddhists argued for reidentification scepticism. In this essay, I will discuss two responses to this Buddhist argument. The first response, defended by Vācaspati Miśra (9th century CE), is that our outer senses allow us to knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will claim that this proposal is problematic. The second response, due to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th century CE), is that the manas or the inner sense, functioning as a capacity of attention, helps us knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will explain how this second response answers the Buddhists’ challenge.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Object reidentification and the epistemic role of attention |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1111/rati.12214 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12214 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | attention, Buddhism, Nyāya, object reidentification, scepticism |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10061169 |
Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
