Van Wietmarschen, JG;
(2019)
Political Testimony.
Politics, Philosophy and Economics
, 18
(1)
pp. 23-45.
10.1177/1470594X18798062.
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Abstract
I argue that reliance on political testimony conflicts with two democratic values: the value of mutual justifiability and the value of equality of opportunity for political influence. Reliance on political testimony is characterized by a reliance on the assertions of others directly on a political question the citizen is asked to answer as part of a formal democratic decision procedure. Reliance on expert testimony generally, even in the context of political decision-making, does not similarly conflict with democratic values. As a consequence of the argument, citizens have a pro tanto reason to rely on their own political judgment when determining their vote, and democratic societies have a reason to only ask citizens questions they are able to answer without reliance on political testimony.
Type: | Article |
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Title: | Political Testimony |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.1177/1470594X18798062 |
Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X18798062 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
Keywords: | Testimony, voting, public reason, political influence, political equality, democracy, moral testimony, democratic deliberation, political epistemology |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10057100 |




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