Bouton, L;
Llorente-Saguer, A;
Malherbe, F;
(2017)
Unanimous rules in the laboratory.
Games and Economic Behavior
, 102
(C)
pp. 179-198.
10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.001.
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Abstract
We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of subject behavior. Finally, we exploit a framing effect to study how the presence of less sophisticated agents affects Veto's welfare properties.
Type: | Article |
---|---|
Title: | Unanimous rules in the laboratory |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.001 |
Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.001 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
Keywords: | Unanimity Rule, Veto Power, Constructive Abstention, Information Aggregation, Laboratory Experiments, Framing |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > UCL School of Management |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10055753 |
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