McFarlane, B;
Douglas, S;
(2022)
Property, Analogy and Variety.
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
, 42
(1)
pp. 161-186.
10.1093/ojls/gqaa043.
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Abstract
How should a court respond if a party argues that, because her right to an intangible asset is a property right, the defendant is under a strict duty not to interfere with that intangible asset? Our view is that such a conclusion does not follow from the premise, and the argument is really one that the party’s right deserves protection as it is sufficiently analogous to a right to a tangible asset.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Property, Analogy and Variety |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1093/ojls/gqaa043 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaa043 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Laws |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10054211 |
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