Luz Sousa Oliveira E Silva, L;
(2017)
Affective Reasoning.
Masters thesis , UCL (University College London).
Abstract
There is a growing body of literature across disciplines that emphasizes that emotions are not straightforwardly opposed to reason, as was once typically thought. Currently, emotion is seen as relevant to practical reasoning and in securing practical ends but as subversive to theoretical reasoning or in securing epistemic ends. This is the view this thesis is concerned with opposing. There is experimental evidence for the existence of so called epistemic emotions playing a role in epistemic evaluation that leave this topic ripe for philosophical treatment. I focus on one epistemic emotion, the feeling of certainty, and argue that it can be a justified and justifying state, such that it can play rational roles in reasoning. Establishing this involves giving an account of how emotions justify evaluative judgments pertaining to epistemic evaluation. How they do so will depend on the theory of emotion endorsed. I argue that the cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion cannot deliver an adequate picture of the rationality of emotions and propose we construe emotions as their own type of distinctive state. Construed as embodied evaluations tied to action tendencies I sketch a proposal for how emotions can justify evaluative beliefs in theoretical reasoning. This account aims to be both philosophically plausible and in accord with current empirical evidence.
| Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
|---|---|
| Title: | Affective Reasoning |
| Event: | University College London |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | emotion, Affect, Reasoning, Metacognition |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10023363 |
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