Vera-Hernandez, M;
(2003)
Structural estimation of a principal-agent model: moral hazard in medical insurance.
RAND J ECON
, 34
(4)
670 - 693.
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Abstract
Despite the importance of principal-agent models in the development of modern economic theory, there are few estimations of these models. I recover the estimates of a principal-agent model and obtain an approximation to the optimal contract. The results show that out-of-pocket payments follow a concave profile with respect to costs of treatment. I estimate the welfare loss due to moral hazard, taking into account income effects. I also propose a new measure of moral hazard based on the conditional correlation between contractible and noncontractible variables.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Structural estimation of a principal-agent model: moral hazard in medical insurance |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cg... |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | EXCESS HEALTH-INSURANCE, PAYROLL RECORDS, WELFARE LOSS, ACCESS VALUE, CARE, DEMAND, UNCERTAINTY, RISK, ECONOMICS, DEDUCTIBLES |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/4097 |
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