UCL Discovery
UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery

A note on CEO compensation, elimination tournaments and bankruptcy risk

Friebel, G.; Matros, A.; (2002) A note on CEO compensation, elimination tournaments and bankruptcy risk. (ELSE Working Papers 58). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK. Green open access

[thumbnail of 14640.pdf]
Preview
PDF
14640.pdf

Download (179kB)

Abstract

We investigate an economy in which firms have different risks to go bankrupt. We observe two things: first, workers in firms with higher bankruptcy risk (bad firms) always work less than workers in good firms. Second, the CEOs of bad firms may nonetheless receive larger wages.

Type: Working / discussion paper
Title: A note on CEO compensation, elimination tournaments and bankruptcy risk
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2002
Language: English
Keywords: JEL classification: L2, M5. Agency, incentives, compensation
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14640
Downloads since deposit
202Downloads
Download activity - last month
Download activity - last 12 months
Downloads by country - last 12 months

Archive Staff Only

View Item View Item