Meckled-Garcia, Saladin;
(2016)
The Ethics of Establishment: Fairness and Human Rights as Different
Standards of Neutrality.
In: Guesnet, François and Laborde, Cécile and Lee, Lois, (eds.)
Negotiating Religion: Cross-disciplinary perspectives.
(pp. 95-114).
Routledge: Abingdon, UK.
Preview |
Text
Meckled-Garcia_Human Rights.pdf Download (649kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Is any degree of religious establishment compatible with human rights? A number of theorists have recently claimed that respect for human rights or basic rights, rather than complete church and state separation, can serve as a sufficient threshold for justified state action.1 Yet the truth of that claim requires that some degree of establishment being compatible with respect for those rights. One way to argue respect for human rights and establishment are not compatible is to argue that human rights necessarily require state neutrality. This, indeed, has formed the basis of recent criticism of judgements of the European Court of Human Rights that allow states some discretion on matters of state-church relations. 2 Those who wish to be more permissive about establishment would need, then, an argument for compatibility.
Type: | Book chapter |
---|---|
Title: | The Ethics of Establishment: Fairness and Human Rights as Different Standards of Neutrality |
ISBN-13: | 9781472437297 |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
Publisher version: | https://www.routledge.com/Negotiating-Religion-Cro... |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Political Science |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1412675 |
Archive Staff Only
View Item |