Carter, Sam;
Goldstein, Simon;
(2023)
Getting Accurate about Knowledge.
Mind
, 132
(525)
pp. 158-191.
10.1093/mind/fzac009.
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Abstract
There is a large literature exploring how accuracy constrains rational degrees of belief. This paper turns to the unexplored question of how accuracy constrains knowledge. We begin by introducing a simple hypothesis: increases in the accuracy of an agent’s evidence never lead to decreases in what the agent knows. We explore various precise formulations of this principle, consider arguments in its favour, and explain how it interacts with different conceptions of evidence and accuracy. As we show, the principle has some noteworthy consequences for the wider theory of knowledge. First, it implies that an agent cannot be justified in believing a set of mutually inconsistent claims. Second, it implies the existence of a kind of epistemic blindspot: it is not possible to know that one’s evidence is misleading.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Getting Accurate about Knowledge |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1093/mind/fzac009 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac009 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | © Mind Association 2022. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10197127 |
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