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Algorithmic attention rents: A theory of digital platform market power

O'Reilly, T; Strauss, I; Mazzucato, M; (2024) Algorithmic attention rents: A theory of digital platform market power. Data and Policy , 6 , Article e6. 10.1017/dap.2024.1. Green open access

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Abstract

We outline a theory of algorithmic attention rents in digital aggregator platforms. We explore the way that as platforms grow, they become increasingly capable of extracting rents from a variety of actors in their ecosystems - users, suppliers, and advertisers - through their algorithmic control over user attention. We focus our analysis on advertising business models, in which attention harvested from users is monetized by reselling the attention to suppliers or other advertisers, though we believe the theory has relevance to other online business models as well. We argue that regulations should mandate the disclosure of the operating metrics that platforms use to allocate user attention and shape the free side of their marketplace, as well as details on how that attention is monetized.

Type: Article
Title: Algorithmic attention rents: A theory of digital platform market power
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1017/dap.2024.1
Publisher version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/dap.2024.1
Language: English
Additional information: Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited. Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press
Keywords: advertising, algorithms, business models, platforms, regulation
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of the Built Environment
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of the Built Environment > Inst for Innovation and Public Purpose
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10188892
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