Koessler, Frédéric;
Skreta, Vasiliki;
(2023)
Informed Information Design.
Journal of Political Economy
, 131
(11)
pp. 3186-3232.
10.1086/724843.
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Abstract
We study informed persuasion, whereby a privately informed designer without ex ante commitment power chooses disclosure mechanisms to influence agents’ actions. We characterize the subset of Bayes-correlated equilibria yielding every designer type a payoff higher than what they could get from any disclosure mechanism with credible beliefs. This set of interim-optimal mechanisms is nonempty and tractable, and all its elements are perfect Bayesian equilibrium mechanisms of the informed-designer game. Interim-optimal mechanisms are characterized via belief-based approaches in pure persuasion settings. We identify single- and multiagent interactive environments in which ex ante–optimal mechanisms are interim optimal.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Informed Information Design |
| DOI: | 10.1086/724843 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/724843 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10185609 |
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