Horton, Joe;
(2023)
Supererogation, Conditional Obligation, and the All or Nothing Problem.
In: Heyd, David, (ed.)
Handbook of Supererogation.
(pp. 51-61).
Springer: Singapore.
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Abstract
If doing good is often beyond the call of duty, instances of the All or Nothing Problem abound. I have argued elsewhere that we should solve this problem by accepting a principle that I call Optimific Altruism, which has interesting implications both for the correct account of supererogation and for our obligations to give to charity. However, Theron Pummer and Daniel Muñoz have argued that we should instead solve this problem by rejecting an inference rule that I call Conditional Obligation. I here recap my preferred solution and argue against this alternative.
| Type: | Book chapter |
|---|---|
| Title: | Supererogation, Conditional Obligation, and the All or Nothing Problem |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-981-99-3633-5_4 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3633-5_4 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10184156 |
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