Szerman, Christiane;
(2023)
The Employee Costs of Corporate Debarment in Public Procurement.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
, 15
(1)
pp. 411-441.
10.1257/app.20200669.
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Abstract
This paper studies an anticorruption policy—corporate debarment, or blacklisting—to understand how disclosing illicit corporate practices and the sanctions for these practices affect firm and worker outcomes. Exploiting a policy change in Brazil that imposed stricter penalties for corrupt firms, I find that debarment is associated with a sizable decline in employment and an increase in the probability of exiting the formal sector. I also document that workers’ annual earnings fall after debarment. The impacts are driven by lost revenues from government contracts. The results shed light on the costs to workers in weighing the consequences of corruption crackdown. (JEL D73, E26, H57, H83, J31, K42, O17)
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | The Employee Costs of Corporate Debarment in Public Procurement |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1257/app.20200669 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200669 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10181104 |
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