Davis, Benjamin;
(2023)
Un-willed Beliefs: An Essay on Voluntariness and Doxastic
Voluntarism.
Masters thesis (M.Phil.Stud), UCL (University College London).
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Abstract
Doxastic involuntarism is somewhat of an epistemological orthodoxy. Contra this orthodoxy, I argue that doxastic voluntarism is routinely true. The aim is to argue for this by exploring the nature of the voluntary. Following Hyman, I argue that our apprehension of voluntariness has been subject to serious error. In particular, our notion of what is voluntary has become conflated with notions about what it is to act as such. This is because theories of action confounded acts of will with voluntariness. This diminishes us philosophically because in consequence, we understand neither action simpliciter nor voluntariness on their own terms. I defend and argue for Hyman’s position that voluntariness is a concept whose primary dominion spans the ethical dimension of human conduct, whereas the question of what it is to act concerns agency as such; what it is for a power to produce or cause change, and how action differs from mere movement. By restoring voluntariness back to the ethical axis of human conduct, we achieve a clearer view of its nature. Voluntariness is destroyed by ignorance and compulsion. Moreover, only the doings and undergoings of doxastic and evaluative creatures are properly subject to predications of voluntariness and involuntariness. I use this to articulate a new account of doxastic voluntarism, because epistemology too has been infected by this error. Voluntarism is true just in case the doxastic ignorance and compulsion conditions don’t apply. Upon elucidating these conditions, I argue that generally, these conditions don’t apply when we form and hold beliefs. This is true whether we are doxastic agents or patients. By abjuring notions of will from doxastic voluntarism and involuntarism, that is, by un-willing beliefs, we gain a clear picture of the relation between voluntariness and belief. The picture informs us that doxastic voluntarism is true, and routinely so.
| Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
|---|---|
| Qualification: | M.Phil.Stud |
| Title: | Un-willed Beliefs: An Essay on Voluntariness and Doxastic Voluntarism |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Copyright © The Author 2022. Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms. Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10171689 |
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