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Communication with forgetful liars

Jehiel, P; (2021) Communication with forgetful liars. Theoretical Economics , 16 (2) pp. 605-638. 10.3982/TE4154. Green open access

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Abstract

I consider multiround cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar's expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium distribution of lies aggregated over all possible realizations of the states. The approach is used to shed light on when the full truth is almost surely elicited, and when multiple lies can arise in equilibrium. Elaborations are proposed to shed light on why nontrivial communication protocols are used in criminal investigations.

Type: Article
Title: Communication with forgetful liars
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.3982/TE4154
Publisher version: http://doi.org/10.3982/TE4154
Language: English
Additional information: © 2021 The Author. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License 4.0. Available at https://econtheory.org. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4154
Keywords: Forgetful liars, lie detection, analogy-based expectations, cheap talk
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10129202
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