Broadbent, Alex B.; (2003) Referential relativity. Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London).

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Abstract

This essay concerns the possibility that our words do not refer in the way that we normally take them to. I explore arguments presented by Quine, in Ontological Relativity, and the so-called "model-theoretic" arguments of Putnam's in the late seventies and early eighties. My aim is not to add a new position to the existing pantheon, but to add argument. In particular I defend Quine and Putnam against the most common justification for the dismissive attitude with which these arguments are sometimes met. I start by arguing that the works of Quine and Putnam mentioned are very closely linked—in fact, they have at least one argument in common. This is of relevance because many philosophers who are scathing of Putnam are less scathing of Quine. I argue that much of what goes for one goes for the other, on this topic. I describe in detail the shared argument: its essence is the claim that we could permute the referents of all our terms while still preserving the truth-values or truth-conditions of all our sentences. Then I set out the common challenge. The challengers say that a possible source of determinate reference has been ignored. Putnam (and Quine) only consider constraints imposed on reference by the use we make of our terms; in particular, they focus heavily on the empirical constraints that the reference relation must meet. Objectors say that there might be another kind of constraint—an external constraint—that acts (partially) independently of our experience and activities. I present David Lewis's version of this challenge. I acknowledge this as a loophole in the Quine-Putnam argument. Moreover it can be developed into a consistent position. I attack not its consistency but its plausibility. I suggest that no empirical justification is available for the claim that such constraints act on reference. I suggest further that no a priori justification has been advanced. Thus I argue that utilising the loophole requires making a claim that is, in fact, unjustified: it is a piece of speculative metaphysics. I conclude by suggesting a way to avoid this.

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