Hall, Barry Edward; (2001) Non-conceptual content and vision in action. Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London).

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Abstract

In this thesis, I argue that there is a way in which visual awareness guides action that must be characterised nonconceptually. I argue for two conditions on concept possession: the generality constraint and McDowell's re-identification constraint. I argue that there is kind of visuo-spatial content of experience which guides action for which these two constraints are not met. I call this kind of content 'pragmatic content'. The guiding idea is that there is a way in which objects or properties appear in everyday contexts of using them such that how they appear is not independent of the subject using them on a particular occassion. The way in which they appear is due to a distinctive kind of content, pragmatic content. I use recent empirical work to how this kind of content is reflected in recent work in cognitive neuroscience. I respond to an objection that the kind of pragmatic content posited in the neurosciences is not phenomenologically salient. In the final part of this thesis, I argue against McDowell's argument that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual. He argues perceptions are reasons for empirical beliefs, and that perceptions are reasons for empirical beliefs only if they have conceptual content, because all reasons must be subject to subjective reflection and only conceptual states can meet that demand. I argue that this demand can be met by the nonconceptualist. I suggest and defend a technique for meeting the demand proposed by Evans.

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