Leigh, F;
(2020)
Self-knowledge, Elenchus, and Authority in Early Plato.
Phronesis
, 65
(3)
pp. 247-280.
10.1163/15685284-BJA10020.
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Abstract
In some of Plato’s early dialogues we find a concern with correctly ascertaining the contents of a particular kind of one’s own psychological states, cognitive states. Indeed, one of the achievements of the elenctic method is to facilitate cognitive self-knowledge. In the Alcibiades, moreover, Plato interprets the Delphic injunction, ‘know yourself’, as crucially requiring cognitive self-knowledge, and ending in knowing oneself as subject to particular epistemic norms. Epistemic authority for self-knowledge is, for Plato, conferred on the basis of correct application of norms to cognitive self-ascriptions, and not confined to the first-personal perspective. This implies first-personal plural epistemic authority for self-knowledge.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Self-knowledge, Elenchus, and Authority in Early Plato |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1163/15685284-BJA10020 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-BJA10020 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | © Fiona Leigh, 2020. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). |
| Keywords: | self-knowledge; elenchus; epistemic authority; dialogue; Alcibiades; Apology; Laches; Gorgias |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10100708 |
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