Kürbis, N;
(2012)
How fundamental is the fundamental assumption?
Teorema:International Journal of Philosophy
, 31
(2)
pp. 5-19.
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Abstract
The fundamental assumption of Dummett's and Prawitz' proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that 'if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator'. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett's and Prawitz' project of providing a logical basis for metaphysics only relies on the restricted assumption.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | How fundamental is the fundamental assumption? |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | https://www.unioviedo.es/Teorema/English/Issues/XX... |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | Proof-theoretic Semantics, Michael Dummett, Dag Prawitz, Verificationist, Theories of Meaning, Realism vs. Anti-Realism |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10072819 |
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