Das, N;
Berger, D;
(2019)
Accuracy and credal imprecision.
Noûs
10.1111/nous.12274.
(In press).
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Abstract
Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have imprecise credal states (i.e. credal states representable only by sets of credence functions) rather than precise ones (i.e. credal states representable by single credence functions). Some writers have recently argued that this claim conflicts with accuracy-centered epistemology, i.e., the project of justifying epistemic norms by appealing solely to the overall accuracy of the doxastic states they recommend. But these arguments are far from decisive. In this essay, we prove some new results, which show that there is little hope for reconciling the rationality of credal imprecision with accuracy-centered epistemology
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Accuracy and credal imprecision |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1111/nous.12274 |
| Publisher version: | http://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12274 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Copyright © 2019 The Authors Nous Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial‐NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non‐commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10066327 |
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