Limanowski, J;
Friston, K;
(2018)
'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference.
Frontiers in Psychology
, 9
, Article 643. 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00643.
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Abstract
One of the central claims of the Self-model Theory of Subjectivity is that the experience of being someone – even in a minimal form – arises through a transparent phenomenal self-model, which itself can in principle be reduced to brain processes. Here, we consider whether it is possible to distinguish between phenomenally transparent and opaque states in terms of active inference. We propose a relationship of phenomenal opacity to expected uncertainty or precision; i.e., the capacity for introspective attention and implicit mental action. Thus we associate introspective attention with the deployment of ‘precision’ that may render the perceptual evidence (for action) opaque, while treating transparency as a necessary aspect of beliefs about action, i.e., ‘what I am’ doing. We conclude by proposing how we may have to nuance our conception of minimal phenomenal selfhood and agency in light of this active inference conception of transparency-opacity.
Type: | Article |
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Title: | 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00643 |
Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00643 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | Copyright © 2018 Limanowski and Friston. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. |
Keywords: | active inference, attention, mental action, opacity, transparency, self-model |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > School of Life and Medical Sciences UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > School of Life and Medical Sciences > Faculty of Brain Sciences UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > School of Life and Medical Sciences > Faculty of Brain Sciences > UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > School of Life and Medical Sciences > Faculty of Brain Sciences > UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology > Imaging Neuroscience |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10049750 |
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