Bonnell, Stephen David; (2018) In what sense, if any, is there movement in Hegel’s system? Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London).

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Abstract

The essay is composed of two parts. The first part responds to Trendelenburg’s objections (in his Logische Untersuchungen) to Hegel’s derivation of the concept ‘becoming’ from the concepts ‘pure being’ and ‘pure nothing’ in the Science of Logic. To do this, I present an outline of the first steps of the Logic. The aim is to suggest that Trendelenburg and Hegel have different standards for what an adequate ‘becoming’ concept is. Trendelenburg emphasises the requirement that the concept be capable of capturing difference intrinsic to the content of the concept. Yet Hegel holds that the concept ‘becoming’ can be adequate despite the fact that it has no difference intrinsic to a content because it has no content at all. I point to Hegel’s account of vanishing as the sense of movement in the opening stages of the logic. The second part is a constructive account of what I take concepts and some of the senses of movement to be in Hegel. It will draw on the account I have given of the opening stages of the logic. It will be based on some distinctions I find in §53 of the preface to the Phenomenology. Included as an appendix is my translation of the section from the Logische Untersuchungen that is in question.

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