Roketskiy, N;
(2018)
Competition and networks of collaboration.
Theoretical Economics
, 13
(3)
pp. 1077-1110.
10.3982/TE2492.
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Abstract
I develop a model of collaboration between tournament participants in which agents collaborate in pairs, and an endogenous structure of collaboration is represented by a weighted network. The agents are forward-looking and capable of coordination; they value collaboration with others and higher tournament rankings. I use von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets as a solution. I find stable networks in which agents collaborate only within exclusive groups. Both an absence of intergroup collaboration and excessive intragroup collaboration lead to inefficiency. I provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of efficient outcomes in winner-takes-all tournaments. I show that the use of transfers does not repair efficiency.
Type: | Article |
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Title: | Competition and networks of collaboration |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.3982/TE2492 |
Publisher version: | http://doi.org/10.3982/TE2492 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | © 2018 The Author. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode) |
Keywords: | Network, collaboration, farsighted agent, stable set, tournament |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10038679 |
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