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Competition and networks of collaboration

Roketskiy, N; (2018) Competition and networks of collaboration. Theoretical Economics , 13 (3) pp. 1077-1110. 10.3982/TE2492. Green open access

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Abstract

I develop a model of collaboration between tournament participants in which agents collaborate in pairs, and an endogenous structure of collaboration is represented by a weighted network. The agents are forward-looking and capable of coordination; they value collaboration with others and higher tournament rankings. I use von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets as a solution. I find stable networks in which agents collaborate only within exclusive groups. Both an absence of intergroup collaboration and excessive intragroup collaboration lead to inefficiency. I provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of efficient outcomes in winner-takes-all tournaments. I show that the use of transfers does not repair efficiency.

Type: Article
Title: Competition and networks of collaboration
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.3982/TE2492
Publisher version: http://doi.org/10.3982/TE2492
Language: English
Additional information: © 2018 The Author. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode)
Keywords: Network, collaboration, farsighted agent, stable set, tournament
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of SandHS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10038679
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