Cripps, M. and Mailath, G. and Samuelson, L. (2007) Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships. (ELSE Working Papers 253). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private beliefs, so that the informed players reputation is private.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2007 |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | JEL classification: C70, C78. Reputation, imperfect monitoring, repeated games, commitment, private beliefs |
| UCL classification: | UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics |
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