Cripps, M.;
Mailath, G.;
Samuelson, L.;
(2007)
Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships.
(ELSE Working Papers
253).
ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
![[thumbnail of 14445.pdf]](https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) Preview |
PDF
14445.pdf Download (347kB) |
Abstract
For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private beliefs, so that the informed player�s reputation is private.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2007 |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | JEL classification: C70, C78. Reputation, imperfect monitoring, repeated games, commitment, private beliefs |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14445 |
Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
