Friebel, G. and Matros, A. (2002) A note on CEO compensation, elimination tournaments and bankruptcy risk. (ELSE Working Papers 58). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
We investigate an economy in which firms have different risks to go bankrupt. We observe two things: first, workers in firms with higher bankruptcy risk (bad firms) always work less than workers in good firms. Second, the CEOs of bad firms may nonetheless receive larger wages.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | A note on CEO compensation, elimination tournaments and bankruptcy risk |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2002 |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | JEL classification: L2, M5. Agency, incentives, compensation |
| UCL classification: | UCL > School of Arts and Social Sciences > Faculty of Social and Historical Sciences > Economics |
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