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Household Nash equilibrium with voluntarilycontributed public goods

Lechene, V; Preston, I; (2005) Household Nash equilibrium with voluntarilycontributed public goods. UCL (University College London), The Institute for Fiscal Studies Green open access

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Abstract

We study noncooperative models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods. We focus on interior equilibria inwhich neither agent is bound by non negativity constraints, establishing the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.While adding-up and homogeneity hold, negativity and symmetryproperties are generally violated. We derive the counterpart to theSlutsky matrix, and show that it can be decomposed into the sum ofa symmetric and negative semidefinite matrix and another the rankof which never exceeds the number of public goods plus one. Underseparability of the public goods the deviation from symmetry is atmost rank two.

Type: Report
Title: Household Nash equilibrium with voluntarilycontributed public goods
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Additional information: Imported via OAI, 7:29:01 15th Mar 2007; Imported via OAI, 7:29:01 26th Jun 2007
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/2725
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