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Testing for Adverse Selection into Private Medical Insurance

Olivella, P; Vera-Hernández, M; (2006) Testing for Adverse Selection into Private Medical Insurance. The Institute for Fiscal Studies Green open access

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Abstract

We develop a test for adverse selection and use it to examine privatehealth insurance markets. In contrast to earlier papers that consider apurely private system or a system in which private insurance supplementsa public system, we focus our attention on a system where privately fundedhealth care is substitutive of the publicly funded one. Using a model ofcompetition among insurers, we generate predictions about the correlationbetween risk and the probability of taking private insurance under bothsymmetric information and adverse selection. These predictions constitutethe basis for our adverse selection test. The theoretical model is also usefulto conclude that the setting that we focus on is especially attractive to testfor adverse selection. Using the British Household Panel Survey, we findevidence that adverse selection is present in this market. We develop a test for adverse selection and use it to examine privatehealth insurance markets. In contrast to earlier papers that consider apurely private system or a system in which private insurance supplementsa public system, we focus our attention on a system where privately fundedhealth care is substitutive of the publicly funded one. Using a model ofcompetition among insurers, we generate predictions about the correlationbetween risk and the probability of taking private insurance under bothsymmetric information and adverse selection. These predictions constitutethe basis for our adverse selection test. The theoretical model is also usefulto conclude that the setting that we focus on is especially attractive to testfor adverse selection. Using the British Household Panel Survey, we find evidence that adverse selection is present in this market.

Type: Report
Title: Testing for Adverse Selection into Private Medical Insurance
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1920/wp.ifs.2006.0602
Additional information: Imported via OAI, 7:29:01 6th Mar 2007; Imported via OAI, 7:29:01 18th May 2007
Keywords: Contract theory, Testing, Health Insurance
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/2697
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